University of North Florida

UNF Digital Commons
All Volumes (2001-2008)

The Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry

2002

The Availability Heuristic in Judgments of Research Findings:
Manipulations of Subjective Experience
Michele A. Shams
University of North Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_volumes
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Suggested Citation
Shams, Michele A., "The Availability Heuristic in Judgments of Research Findings: Manipulations of
Subjective Experience" (2002). All Volumes (2001-2008). 112.
https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_volumes/112

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the The Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry at UNF
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
All Volumes (2001-2008) by an authorized administrator
of UNF Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact Digital Projects.
© 2002 All Rights Reserved

The Availability Heuristic in Judgments
of Research Findings: Manipulations of
SUbjective Experience
Michele A. Shams
Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Dan Richard

Abstract
Previous studies have demonstrated
that what is easy to call to mind will
influence judgments. The impact of a
person's subjective experience was tested
for its influence on judgments of social
psychological research findings. Eightythree college students generated
examples of 40 research findings.
Students subsequently judged the ease
with which the examples came to mind
and the probability of experiencing
similar examples. Students then
evaluated the obviousness and
importance of and their interest in the
research outcomes. Students also
provided demographic information and
indicated their previous knowledge in
psychology. In the current study, the ease
with which examples of research findings
could be recalled influenced student's
obviousness but not importance
judgments. Other studies found that
obviousness and importance judgments
of research findings are positively
related. The relationship between these
judgments was not replicated in the
current study. Results are discussed in
terms of the availability heuristic and
other cognitive strategies involved in lay
judgments of research.
Introduction
People acquire and process knowledge
about their social world in different ways.
One way people gain knowledge is through
past experience. People often use their past
experiences with others, for example, to
develop and test lay theories (Heider,

114 Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry

1958). Scientists also develop and test
theories about human behavior. Scientists
and lay people, however, may think
differently about the importance of research
outcomes. Scientists think that if a finding
is obvious, then it is not important to
conduct further research on that topic.
Studies have shown that when lay people
think a finding is obvious, they also think
that it is important (Richard, Bond, and
Stokes-Zoota, 2001). Scientists conduct
research to gain knowledge that could
eventually be beneficial to the general
public (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, &
Gonzales, 1990). In order for scientific
information to be beneficial, scientists must
disseminate the information to the public in
a way that people can understand. Scientists
must understand lay knowledge if they are
to communicate important information to
the public and if this information is to be
received. The current study was designed to
better understand how lay people interpret
and process scientific information.
Scientists use a defined method. They
think critically, formulate hypotheses, and
test theories. Psychologists believe that lay
people think much like scientists (Heider,
1958). People interpret and then assimilate
new information into their existing mental
systems through a form of hypothesis
testing. The lay person's hypothesis testing
is similar to a scientist's because they both
rule out alternative possibilities. The lay
person's hypothesis testing, however, is not
as comprehensive as a scientist's process
(Fiske & Taylor, 1982).
Other studies reveal that scientists and
lay people may differ in how they interpret
the results of scientific hypothesis testing.
Scientists feel that an obvious finding is not
interesting and not important, hence not
worthy of research. Scientists are afraid of
wasting precious resources investigating
topics that are already known. Research
findings that do not appear obvious arouse
curiosity and are investigated further
(Aronson et aI., 1990). Lay people,
however, may respond differently to
research they consider surprising. Richard

et aL (2001) investigated the differences in
lay peoples' perceptions of social
psychological results. Students read 398
findings gathered from published social
psychological research reviews. The
researchers asked college students to make
a judgment about each research finding.
Some students indicated whether each
finding was obvious or not obvious, some
indicated whether each finding was
interesting or not interesting, and others
indicated whether each finding was
important or not important. The research
findings most college students judged as
obvious were the findings other students
judged as important. Although scientists
consider obvious research as unimportant,
lay people believe the most obvious
research findings are the most important.
In an effort to see if lay people and
scientists differ drastically in how they
evaluate research, Richard et aL (2001)
asked students to read each research finding
and judge whether they think the finding is
important enough for scientists to conduct
further research on that topic. If students
evaluate research like social scientists, then
findings considered obvious would be
judged as least important for scientists to
pursue further. The opposite occurred.
Students indicated that it was more
important to conduct additional research on
obvious findings and less important to
pursue non-obvious fmdings. Richard et
aL's (2001) study demonstrated that what
the lay person considers important is not
necessarily consistent with what a scientist
typically would consider important.
Perhaps what a lay person believes is
obvious is not what a scientist considers
obvious. Scientists consider obvious what
is already known (Aronson et aI., 1990).
Sometimes what lay people consider an
obvious research finding may not always be
a true finding. People may believe, for
example, that when it comes to romantic
relationships, "opposites attract," but social
psychological research has suggested that
people become romantically involved with
people who are similar (Feingold, 1988).

Researchers have investigated inaccuracies
lay people have when evaluating research.
In Richard et aL's (2001) study, people
accurately distinguished between true
findings and foil findings. The research
findings lay people find obvious, therefore,
are the findings they can predict
Wong (1995) also evaluated lay
judgments of research findings. In her
study, Wong presented students with 12
teaching-related research findings and
asked the students to rate the obviousness
of each statement. People rated summaries
that stated the opposite of actual research
outcomes as more obvious than the original
outcomes themselves. In addition,
providing a rationale for a finding, whether
it was an actual finding or an opposite
finding, increased the degree to which
people rated the research summary as
obvious. Feelings of obviousness tended to
bias a person's judgments and were not a
good measure of accuracy when students
judged research results. Richard et aL
(2001) found that students can distinguish
true findings from foil findings and that
true findings rated as obvious also were
accurately distinguished from foils.
Evidence demonstrates that lay people do
have a sense of true psychological research
findings and that what is important to lay
people tends to be what is obvious.
Research has demonstrated that lay
people do think differently than scientists
regarding judgments of research findings.
The way lay people make judgments of
research and their subjective experiences
when making these judgments can be
important in understanding differences
between scientists and non-scientists.
Making a judgment about research involves
a process rather than a single act. Strack
(1992) introduced a model that outlines this
judgment process. When making any
judgment, a person goes through two
phases: an exposure phase and a judgment
phase. In the exposure phase, a person is
presented with a stimulus. Concurrently,
the person evaluates information that is
given about the stimulus, his or her own

Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry 115

past experiences relating to the stimulus,
and the process information (e.g. how easy
or difficult it is for the person to think of
experiences) relating to the stimulus. The
exposure phase is completed before
continuing to the judgment phase. In the
judgment phase, the person evaluates how
the information obtained in the exposure
phase compares to previous knowledge
relating to the stimulus. The person then
checks and corrects the information for
perceived biases. Finally, a judgment is
made. Judgments are greatly affected by
how past experiences and information from
the process of making the judgment are
integrated (see Figure 1). When making a
judgment, people use information from past
experiences and from what is available in
their minds at the time of judgment.

The Availability Heuristic
The availability heuristic, a common
cognitive strategy in human decisionmaking, provides an example of how the
process of making a judgment influences
the evaluation of relevant events. People's
judgments of probability and frequency of
events are based on the ease with which
examples of those events come to mind
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Tversky
and Kahneman demonstrated how ease of
recall affects probability judgments using
lists of famous male and female names.
Participants reviewed a list of an equal
number of female and male names. Some
lists contained famous male names and
some contained famous female names. The
participants then made estimates of the
frequency of male and female names.
Famous names were more likely recalled
and produced higher frequency estimates.
Judgments of frequency were affected by
what was salient in the mind of the person
making the judgment.
Information that is salient in one's
mind can bias one's judgments. The
hindsight bias occurs when people have
previous outcome knowledge of a certain
event and base their decisions on that
knowledge (Slovic and Fischoff, 1977). An
116 Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry

availability heuristic is responsible for the
hindsight bias because previous knowledge
about a stimulus is readily available in a
person's mind and can be retrieved to make
a decision.
Slovic and Fischhoff (1977) evaluated
how lay people evaluate research and what
factors influence the evaluation process.
The researchers assigned participants to
either a hindsight group or a foresight
group. Both groups reviewed four different
research scenarios. The investigator told the
foresight group about two possible
outcomes that could occur and asked them
to predict the probability of each outcome,
explain why it might occur, and estimate
the likelihood of that outcome happening
again if the study were replicated. The
investigator told the hindsight group only
about one of the two outcomes, asked them
to explain why it had occurred, and had the
students evaluate the probability that the
research outcome would be replicated. The
participants given one outcome estimated a
higher probability for the results being
replicated than did the participants who
were given two outcomes to consider.
In a second experiment, Slovic and
Fishhoff (1977) tested whether hindsight
participants responded like foresight
participants if forced to consider two
alternative outcomes for a research
experiment instead of just one. The
researchers had students consider
alternative outcomes to an already known
research result. Students believed that
replicating the research outcomes was less
probable when they considered two
possible outcomes as opposed to just one
outcome. Hindsight participants responded
similar to foresight participants who have
no prior knowledge of a research outcome.
The hindsight bias was reduced when
students were asked to consider alternative
research outcomes.
Davies (1987) conducted three
experiments to demonstrate that the
hindsight bias could be eliminated. In the
first experiment, Davies presented students
with four scenarios based on psychological

studies. He asked participants to write
notes about the studies and evaluate the
scenarios. The students returned two weeks
later and received one of four conditions.
In the first condition, the investigator
informed students of the outcomes of the
scenarios, showed students their original
notes, and then asked them to estimate the
likelihood of the outcomes as if they had
never known the outcome. In the second
condition, the investigator gave the same
instructions except that the students did not
review their original notes. Experimenters
then instructed the students to try and
remember how they originally judged the
outcomes prior to the outcome knowledge
they received. In the third condition,
students did not receive the outcomes, but
they did review their original notes. In the
forth condition, students did not receive the
outcome and did not review their previous
notes. All students were asked to make a
probability judgment of the outcome while
recalling what they had originally thought
about the outcomes.
Davies (1987) found that there was a
hindsight bias. Students who reviewed the
outcomes of the scenarios judged them as
more probable than did students who did
not review the outcomes. Davies
demonstrated that helping people remember
what they had originally thought prior to
discovering the true research outcome
could eliminate the hindsight bias. Lay
judgments of research, therefore, are
influenced by the information available in
memory and the experiences of recalling
that information.

Subjective Experience
Judgments are influenced by the
content of information in memory and by
the process by which the content is
accessed. The experience of how easy or
difficult information is called to mind can
be just as important as the information
recalled. Self-assessments, for example,
are influenced by the ease with which one
can recall examples related to that
assessment (Schwarz, Strack, Bless,

Klumpp, and Rittenauer-Schatka, 1991).
Schwarz et al. manipulated subjective ease
by asking students to generate either 6 or
12 examples of times in their recent past
when they were assertive (or unassertive).
Generating 6 examples was considered an
easy task whereas generating 12 examples
was considered a difficult task. The
researchers assumed that if students made
judgments based solely on the content of
their recollections, the more assertive
examples they generated, the higher their
self-ratings of assertiveness. If students
considered the ease of recalling these
assertive behaviors, then the difficult task
ofrecalling 12 assertive examples would
lower their self-ratings of assertiveness, and
the easy task of recalling 6 examples would
raise their self-ratings of assertiveness.
Results showed that the more difficult it
was to think of assertive examples, the
lower students' self-assessments of
assertiveness, and the more difficult it was
to think of unassertive examples, the higher
their self-assessments of assertiveness.
Experienced ease of recalling instances of
assertive or unassertive behaviors had a
larger effect on self-assessments than did
the number of instances recalled. People
make judgments not only based on the
content of the information they are judging
but also based on the ease with which the
content comes to mind.
In other studies, memory accessibility
effectively altered example recall
(MacLeod & Campbell, 1992). The
researchers used a mood induction
procedure to manipulate ease of memory
accessibility. Participants were placed in
either a negative mood or a positive mood
using a mood induction procedure.
Experimenters presented participants with
either a pleasant or an unpleasant event and
asked them to recall a personal memory
that would apply to that event. Participants
then rated the future probability of
experiencing the event in the future.
The researchers hypothesized that
recall times and probability judgments
would be inversely related. The longer it
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takes a person to think of examples, the
less salient it is in memory; therefore, the
probability of the event occurring in the
future would seem unlikely. If the mood
induction was successful, then recall times
for pleasant events would be shorter for
participants in a positive mood than
for those in a negative mood, and recall
times for unpleasant events would be
shorter for people in a negative mood than
for those in a positive mood (MacLeod &
Campbell, 1992).
The researchers found that there is a
significant inverse relationship between the
speed with which past memories of
specified events can be recalled and the
perceived probability of experiencing that
event in the future (MacLeod & Campbell
1992). Basically, those who recalled
passed memories quicker rated them as
more probable to occur in the near future.
By using a mood induction process, the
researchers were successful in modifying
the ease with which positive and negative
memories were recalled. This ease of recall
subsequently influenced probability
judgments. Students in a negative mood
recalled unpleasant events faster and
indicated that unpleasant events have a
higher probability of occurring than
pleasant events. The same pattern occurred
for people in a positive mood recalling
pleasant events. MacLeod and Campbell
demonstrated that subjective experience can
be manipulated and that differences in
subjective experience influence judgments.
Hypothesis
Richard et al. (2001) found that lay
people think obvious research results are
important. One possible explanation for
these findings is that lay people use the ease
with which examples are called to mind
when making judgments of obviousness and
importance. This hypothesis was
investigated in the current study. Groups of
students read brief, type-written social
psychological research findings. Students
generated either one example or five
examples for research findings. For each
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finding, participants rated how easy it was
to generate examples and how probable it
was that similar examples would occur in
the near future. The students also indicated
whether each finding was obvious or not
obvious, important or not important, and
interesting or not interesting. After making
these judgments for each finding,
participants completed a one-page
questionnaire that assessed their level of
psychological knowledge.
The current study attempted to
manipulate subjective experience by
including psychological findings previously
categorized as being easy and difficult to
think of examples and by utilizing an
example generation manipulation. Students
generated either one or five examples of
research findings and then made judgments
of obviousness, importance, and
interestingness. The more difficult it is for
students to think of examples of a research
finding, the less obvious, important and
interesting students will judge that finding.
The findings for which more examples are
requested will be judged as less obvious
and important than findings for which
fewer examples are requested.
The current study attempted to replicate
earlier results on the availability heuristic
and to extend the research to lay judgments
of research findings in the field of social
psychology. If people know the outcome of
psychological research, then they may call
to mind easily accessible information to
judge the probability of future occurrences.
The present study evaluated the use of
accessible information in memory to make
obviousness, importance, and interest
judgments about research outcomes.
Findings for which examples are easily
recalled will be judged as more obvious and
important than findings for which examples
are difficult to recall.

Method

Participants
Participants were undergraduate
students currently enrolled in Introductory
to Psychology courses at a southern
university. One hundred thirteen students
participated and received credit toward
their grade (30 students in the pretest and
83 in the primary study). An experimenter
visited each Introductory Psychology class
and briefly explained the study. Students
were given the opportunity to sign up
immediately or later on a psychology
department bulletin board. All students
were treated in accordance with APA
ethical guidelines.
Materials
The findings presented to students
represent a sample from Richard et al.'s
(2001) study. By examining their data, the
present research team observed the time
students took to read and think of examples
for each finding. Controlling for reading
times, the 25 findings with the shortest
response times were categorized as easy,
and the 25 findings with the longest
response times were categorized as
difficult. These easy and difficult findings
were selected for the current study.
Pretest
Experimenters recruited students from
Introductory Psychology courses and
conducted a pretest to establish whether the
findings selected would be judged as easy
or difficult. Thirty students completed a
packet of 14 findings. The students made
judgments indicating the ease with which
examples came to mind on an eight-point
Likert Scale anchored at one, Not at all
Easy, and eight, Very Easy. The pretest
participants rated a total of 50 findings.
The ease ratings averaged across
participants for each finding served as a
measure of example generation ease.
Students' ratings of ease were accumulated
for each finding. Researchers selected the
20 findings students rated most difficult to

generate examples (M = 4.58, SD = .97)
and the 20 findings students rated most
easy to think of examples (M = 6.59, SD =
.44). As a validity test on the sample of
findings, those findings categorized as easy
received higher ease of example generation
ratings than findings categorized as
difficult, t(38) = 8.43, p < .0005. Findings
categorized as easy represent research
outcomes for which students have examples
readily available in memory. Findings
categorized as difficult represent research
outcomes for which students have few
examples readily available in memory.
Researchers also selected four findings as
neutral findings with a mean ease rating of
M = 5.16 (SD = .54).

Primary Experiment
Students read two neutral findings at
the beginning of each sequence to become
familiar with the task of generating
examples. Each set of test materials
consisted of an equal number of easy
findings (e.g. "When people drink alcohol,
they become aggressive") and difficult
findings (e.g. "Sometimes a message has
more persuasive impact after a delay").
Students viewed and judged an equal
number of findings categorized as easy and
as difficult. This served as a repeatedmeasures factor in the current study.
Appendix A lists the findings categorized as
easy and difficult.
The number of examples the
participants generated served as an
experimental manipulation. Researchers
achieved the manipulation through the
presentation of different survey forms.
Half of the participants generated one
example per research finding and the other
half generated five examples per research
finding. In the one-example condition,
subjects viewed 22 findings, and in the
five-example condition subjects viewed 12
findings. In each condition, students spent
approximately one hour completing the
judgment task.
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In order to control for presentation
order, participants received the statements
in one of two sequences. In the first
sequence, the findings occurred in a fixed
random order. The second sequence was
the opposite of the first. In both sequences,
students read the two neutral findings first
to familiarize them with the task. The
students then viewed the test findings. The
materials did not distinguish between
practice findings and test findings for the
students. Figure 2 presents a diagram of
the various presentation orders across
groups of participants.
After reviewing each finding, students
rated the ease and probability of each
finding based on an eight-point scale
replicated from the pretest. For each
finding, students judged whether the
finding was obvious or not obvious,
important or not important, and interesting
or not interesting. Half of the participants
received the judgments with the affirmative
response stated first (e.g. Obvious or Not
Obvious). The remaining half received the
judgment choices in the opposite order (e.g.
Not Obvious or Obvious).
Once students completed the first set
of materials, they completed an Experience
with Psychology questionnaire. Students
indicated their age, sex (either male or
female), and classification (either
freshmen, sophomore, junior, or senior).
The questionnaire assessed the students'
experience with psychology courses in
high school and college by asking the
students to write the number of courses
they completed at each institution and to
list the topics they studied.

Procedure
Participants for each session were
directed to a room with two rows of six
chairs. The participants read and signed the
informed consent form and received
instructions. The experimenter explained
that the study would take at least one hour
and that if at any time a participant decided
not to continue, he or she could do so

120 Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry

without any penalty. The experimenter read
the following instructions out loud:
"The purpose of this study is to
understand students' judgments of
research findings. You will be given a
number of findings. In the space
provided, generate brief examples that
apply to that finding. Any example is
acceptable. If you feel that after some
time you are struggling to generate an
example, complete the remaining
questions on the page and go on to the
next finding. After thinking of
examples, you will be asked additional
questions about the finding."
Participants then received the
materials containing the research findings.
In the one-example condition, students
read each finding and listed one example
per finding. Immediately after generating
an example, students evaluated how easy it
was to think of the example and how
probable it was that the finding could
occur in the near future. Following the
ease and probability questions, students
made obvious, important, and interesting
judgments. The procedure was identical
for the five-example group with the
exception that students listed five examples
for each finding rather than one. In both
the one-example condition and the fiveexample condition, students generated
examples for findings previously rated as
either easy or difficult. After the
participants finished making judgments,
they completed the Experience with
Psychology questionnaire. The
experimenter debriefed the participants.
Results
Two independent variables were used
for the current study. The first independent
variable was the number of examples
requested (either one or five). The second
independent variable was the expected ease
of examples recalled (easy or difficult, as
determined by the pretest). Students read
both easy and difficult findings; therefore,

this variable served as a within-subjects
factor. The dependent variable was the
proportion of students judging the findings
as obvious and important. The data were
evaluated in two forms: cross-participant
analyses and cross-finding analyses. In
some cases, the test of interest involved
averaging students' responses across
findings. Not all research findings are
identical; therefore, some analyses involved
averaging students' responses for a
particular finding.

Manipulation Check
Analysis of each student's responses
averaged across categories of easy and
difficult findings revealed that students in
fact rated the example generation task
easier for findings previously categorized
as easy (M = 5.95) than for findings
categorized as difficult (M = 4.54), F(l,81)
= 94.25, p < .0005. Students asked to
generate one example found that task easier
(M = 6.11) than students asked to generate
five examples (M = 4.62), F(1,81) = 39.25,
p < .0005. No interaction effects emerged
in judgments of example generation ease
(F < 1). See Figure 3.
Replication of the Availability Heuristic
Consistent with the availability
heuristic, students rated findings in the easy
category as more probable (M = 6.28) than
findings in the difficult category (M = 4.6),
F(1,81) = 163.47,p < .0005. Students
asked to generate one example, however,
found the findings only slightly more
probable to occur in the future (M = 5.7)
than students asked to generate five
findings (M = 5.2) F(1,81) = 3.88, p = .052.
No interaction effects were found in
probability judgments (F < 1). The
manipulation of the number of examples
generated clearly affected students'
experience with subjective ease; however, it
did not clearly affect probability ratings
(See Figure 4).

Judgments of Research Findings
The percentage of affirmative (e.g.
obvious, important, etc.) judgments made
by a participant in each of the example
generation ease categories was observed.
Consistent with the hypothesis, students
were more likely to judge a finding in the
easy category as obvious (M = 85%) than
they were to judge as obvious findings in
the difficult category (M = 50%), F(I,81) =
138.38, P < .0005. According to the
availability heuristic and research on the
hindsight bias, findings for which examples
come to mind easily would be judged as
more obvious than findings for which
examples do not. The manipulation of
subjective ease, however, did not have the
same effect. Students who generated one
example (a subjectively easy task) were not
more likely to judged findings as obvious
than were students who generated five
examples (a subjectively difficult task),
F < 1. See Figure 5.
Analysis of importance judgments
revealed that students judged findings
categorized as easy and those categorized
as difficult as equally important, F(1 ,81) =
.672, p = .415. In addition, students did not
judge findings as more important in either
the one-example condition or the fiveexample condition. No interaction emerged
for importance judgments (F < 1).
Cross-Findings Judgments
To evaluate students' judgments of
research outcomes, the proportion of
students indicating that a finding was
obvious in one presentation order was
compared to the proportion of students
judging the same finding as obvious in the
opposite presentation order. Results
indicate that students agreed with what was
obvious, important and interesting,
Spearman Brown Split-Half Reliability r =
.88, .71, .70, respectively.
Richard et al. (2001) found a positive
relationship between students' judgments of
obviousness and importance of research
findings. The previously observed
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relationship was not replicated in the
current study. The correlations between the
proportion of students (across all
conditions) judging a finding as obvious,
important and interesting are presented in
Table 1. Unlike previous research, no
relationship was observed between the
proportion of students who judged the
finding as obvious and the proportion of
students who judged the finding as
important, r(38) = .09, p = .572. As might
be expected from research on the
availability heuristic, the proportion of
students who judged a finding as obvious
was positively correlated with the average
example generation ease rating for the
finding and the probability that similar
examples would occur in the future,
rs(38) = .89, .76, respectively, both
ps < .0005.
Discussion
Consistent with the hypothesis,
students rated findings as more obvious if
the findings were easily called to mind.
The results of the current study are
consistent with Slovic and Fischoff's
(1977) demonstration of the hindsight bias
and extend Tversky and Kahneman's
(1973) research of the availability heuristic.
What is easily accessed in memory
influenced a student's judgment of research
outcomes. The results indicate that
requiring students to generate several
examples influenced the subjective
experience of ease. The changes in
subjective experience, however, only
slightly influenced probability judgments
and did not influence obvious judgments.
A person's ease ratings of a finding were,
however, influenced by the number of
examples they generated. Students who
generated only one example for a finding
evaluated the generation of examples for a
finding as easier than did students who
generated five examples. The influence of
example generation ease on obvious
judgments suggests a heuristic strategy for
making obvious judgments rather than a
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systematic strategy.
Schwarz (1998) examined previous
studies in which people engaged in
systematic processing when highly invested
(or motivated) in a task and engaged in
heuristic processing in tasks that were less
relevant to the person. Rothman and
Schwarz (1998) found that when people are
motivated, they base their judgments on the
content of information and engage in
systematic processing to assess risk. The
more relevant information that people had
to recall about their health, the higher they
assessed their health risk. People who were
not highly motivated in a task engaged in
heuristic processing and based their risk
assessments on the ease with which they
could recall examples. The less relevant
information people had to recall about their
health, the higher their health-risk
assessment.
When using a heuristic processing
strategy, a person draws information from
his or her subjective experience. People are
more inclined to base their judgment on the
content of the information when using
systematic processing. In the current study,
people tended to judge findings as easier to
think of examples if they only had to
generate one example. If students were
using a heuristic processing strategy to
judge research outcomes, then the ease with
which examples came to mind would have
influenced their obvious and important
judgments. If a systematic process was
used, then students who generated five
examples would have rated the findings as
more obvious. Our results show that
judgments of obviousness were influenced
by the subjective ease of example
generation but not necessarily by the
number of examples generated for a
finding. Students who generated five
findings, in fact, were less likely to judge
the finding as obvious, even though they
generated more examples of the finding.
This result suggests that heuristic
processing rather than systematic
processing was being used to judge the
obviousness of research. There was no

evidence to suggest that experienced ease
affected important or interesting judgments.
Richard et al. (200 1) had found that
findings students judged as obvious were
also findings judged as important. The
positive relationship between obviousness
and importance was not replicated in the
current study. Perhaps the populations used
were different. Richard et al. tested
students at Texas Christian University
(TCU), a private, historically Christian,
mid-sized university, and the current study
tested students at the University of North
Florida (UNF), a mid-sized public
university. The people in these two regions
of the country could respond to research
outcomes differently. People vary in their
motivations and their ability to consider
alternative explanations when making a
judgment (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).
People's motivation to consider other
alternatives when forming a judgment is
influenced by three separate needs: the
need for structure, the fear of invalidity, and
the need for specific closure. The need for
structure motivates people to search for an
answer to clarify ambiguity. This need is
amplified when a person is forced to reach
a clearly defined conclusion. The fear of
invalidity motivates people to be correct so
as not to receive negative social attention
for being invalid. People who experience
high fear of invalidity consider multiple
alternatives and evaluate various
explanations when attempting to solve
problems. The need for specific
conclusions motivates people to have
clearly defined, plausible explanations for
the events in their life.
According to Kruglaski (1983), some
people have a general tendency to seek out
new information as opposed to just seeking
out one answer. Only seeking one answer
would suggest that a person has a high need
for cognitive closure. Students at the UNF
felt that obvious research findings were not
necessarily important. This reasoning is
more consistent with that of a scientist's
thought process. Having a high need for
cognitive closure may have motivated

students in the TCU sample to engage in
heuristic processing to quickly reach an
answer, any answer. Students at UNF,
alternatively, may have used more
systematic processing in an effort to avoid
invalidity. It would be beneficial to not
only examine the differences between lay
people and scientists, but to also observe
the differences among lay people in
different regions of the country.
The current study has reinforced the
idea that lay people utilize information that
is easily accessible in memory to make
judgments. The idea that people use their
subjective experiences as process
information to make judgments received
support in the current study as well. When
people can easily think of examples for a
given research finding, they will consider
the finding obvious. When scientists
disseminate new information to the public
they should consider using subjective
experience to their advantage. Perhaps
giving examples of the research findings
that people can quickly call to mind will
reinforce how the new information is
pertinent to their lives.
The results of this study will help
establish a better understanding of the
factors that influence judgments of research
outcomes. The response scientists receive
from the lay public about the obviousness
and importance of the research can be
influenced by how the information is
presented and by the information about the
finding people already have in memory.
Many social psychological research
outcomes may be important to society.
When scientists discover an important
finding, they will want to effectively
communicate the new information to the
lay public.
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Appendix A: Findings Presented Previously Categorized as Easy and Difficult

Easy Statements Mean
When people drink alcohol, they engage in extreme behaviors.
The members of a group influence one another.
Women are more likely than men to perform care-taking tasks for others.
Women are more skilled at expressing emotion than men.
Leaders are most effective if they have charisma.
People are likely to recycle if they know about recycling.
When people drink alcohol, they become aggressive.
Men are more likely than women to favor premarital sex.
Dormitory crowding makes residents dissatisfied.
People are unlikely to express their opinions without others' support.
Taking a pretest improves a person's score on a posttest.
People work less when in a group than when working alone.
Students who have high self-esteem achieve a lot.
Women are more likely than men to disclose personal information to others.
Smiling increases happiness.
Friends interact more positively with one another than non-friends.
People remember negative events when they are depressed.
People attribute their successes to effort.
Boys are more competitive than girls.
People are most likely to respond to surveys if they are offered monetary incentives.

7.57
7.25
7.13
7.00
6.88
6.86
6.86
6.86
6.57
6.57
6.57
6.43
6.43
6.29
6.29
6.29
6.13
6.00
6.00
6.00

Difficult Statements Mean
Jurors are harsh if the victim is an attractive Anglo-American female.
Persuasive messages that provoke fear are able to induce attitude change.
Negotiators are likely to compromise if they are experienced.
Girls who are reared in father-absent homes are non-feminine.

1.60
3.57
3.83
3.88

Experimenters find the research results they expect to find.
Sometimes a message has more persuasive impact after a delay.
A woman is likely to be held responsible for being raped
if she was previously acquainted with her attacker.
Teachers expect more from attractive than unattractive students.
People with Type A personalities suffer chronic emotional distress.
Empathetic people do not act negatively, antisocially, or abusively.
Children who are helpful can infer others' motives and thoughts.
Men attribute their performance to effort more than women.
Leaders are most effective if they avoid making unnecessary changes.
Nonverbal behavior quickly conveys accurate information about the actor.
In the presence of others, people become physiologically aroused.
Highly masculine men and highly feminine women
have traditional attitudes toward women.
A confident eyewitness gives accurate eyewitness testimony.
There is consistency between people's attitudes and behavior.
The most socially active people report the highest life satisfaction.
People involved in intimate violence give undesirable self-descriptions.

4.00
4.17
4.43
4.43
4.50
4.71
4.71
4.75
4.83
5.00
5.25
5.29
5.33
5.71
5.86
5.86
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Table I
Correlations Between Proportions of Students Judgments of Ease, Probability, Obviousness,
Importance and Interest
Judgment

Ease

Probability

Obvious

Important

Interesting

.782*

.890*

.104

.071

.759*

-.154

-.211

.092

-.018

Ease
Probability
Obvious

.643*

Important

* p < .0005

Figure I. Strack's Model of Social Judgment
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Figure 2. Presentation Order of Test Findings
A.cross Different Experimental Conditions

Figure 3. Manipulation Check for Ease of Example Generation
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Figure 4. Replication of the Availability Heuristic
for the Probability of Future Occurrence
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Figure 4. Replication of the Availability Heuristic
for the Probability of Future Occurrence
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